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The process of discovery in civil litigation is doubly shrouded in fog.  
Fundamentally, as the term “discovery” connotes, the discovery process 
involves parties who lack complete knowledge about their dispute attempting to 
use the litigation process to obtain information.1  Almost by definition, the 
parties and the court operate in a fog of uncertainty when they undertake 
discovery.  There is nothing necessarily troubling about this uncertainty, of 
course; discovery exists precisely to dispel it. 
However, there is a second, more troubling layer of obscurity.  We know very 
little about the timing, volume, and cost of discovery in our civil justice system.  
In what fraction of cases does the gathering of documents in anticipation of 
discovery begin before a lawsuit is even filed?  How much data is gathered in 
the average case?  Setting aside the fees paid to outside counsel, how much does 
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 1. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636‒37 (1989) 
(noting that the threat of discovery is sometimes used as a bargaining tool to exact a favorable 
settlement rather than as a purely information gathering tool). 
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discovery cost the parties, in terms of time and money, in any given case?  It is 
scarcely an exaggeration to say no one knows. 
While many practicing attorneys have rich and detailed knowledge of their 
own experiences, commentators have struggled to collect and organize this 
anecdotal information into a coherent empirical picture.  To this day there is no 
consensus on how much litigation costs in a typical case.  Reputable sources 
provide numbers that may seem surprisingly low—for example, $20,000 for a 
single party2—or surprisingly high, to the tune of millions of dollars.3  As 
another example of the uncertainty, there is anecdotal evidence that many 
companies fear spoliation sanctions arising out of unclear preservation 
obligations; yet there is also evidence that the imposition of sanctions is rare.4  
As a recent report has noted, the “actual costs of discovery have rarely been 
quantified in empirical studies.”5 
This collective ignorance of judges, policymakers, and academics feeds 
uncertainty at both the policy and the doctrinal level.  Policymaking, in the sense 
of rules design, is hamstrung by a lack of information about the activities that 
are the subject of the rules.  While there is no shortage of anecdotes decrying 
excessive costs and burdens of discovery (usually from the defense bar) and 
alarm about stonewalling and evidence destruction (usually from the plaintiffs’ 
bar),6 it is hard to judge the extent of these problems or what, if anything, should 
be done about them. 
Ignorance of how discovery tends to play out in practice leads to confusion 
even at a doctrinal level.  The federal courts appear ambivalent about how to 
address perceived problems with discovery, despite discovery being the subject 
                                               
 2. A Federal Judicial Center study reports that the median discovery costs for defendants in 
civil cases in federal court are $20,000.  Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, National, Case-
Based Civil Rules Survey, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2 (2009) [hereinafter Civil Rules Survey]. 
 3. A study by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) 
estimates discovery costs of $3.5 million for a “midsize” case. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 4 (2008). 
 4. EMERY G. LEE III, MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS BASED UPON SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN 
CIVIL CASES: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3‒
5 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2011). 
 5. Nicholas M. Pace & Laura Zakaras, Where the Money Goes: Understanding Litigant 
Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 4 (2012) 
[hereinafter Where the Money Goes].  See also id. at 3 (“A repeated lament in the academic and 
legal literature is that there has been little or no research into the costs imposed on the larger judicial 
system by the discovery process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The reasons for this are 
manifold.  See infra Part II.A.  See also Where the Money Goes, supra, at 4 (listing various reasons, 
including: “[i]nformation about pretrial expenditures is almost always in the exclusive control of 
litigants and their attorneys”; “[r]esearchers must collect data from multiple sources”; “[i]t may be 
time-consuming or costly for litigants and their attorneys to retrieve relevant data about discovery-
related costs”; “[s]taff in corporate departments, such as those in legal and information technology 
(IT), are unlikely to track their own litigation-related time expenditures”; and “[m]ost importantly, 
organizations may be reluctant to share information about their legal expenditures”). 
 6. See, e.g., LEE III, supra note 4, at 7. 
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of an entire set of rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules).7  For 
example, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,8 the seminal case in 
the paradigm of plausibility pleading, famously fretted about the costs of 
discovery in antitrust litigation but made no use of the Rules governing 
discovery.9 
Today, the most salient discovery-related issue among practitioners is 
“preservation”: the duty to preserve relevant documents and electronically 
stored information (ESI)10 when litigation is reasonably anticipated.  However, 
the Rules do not make clear that preservation is within the scope of discovery—
or for that matter, within the scope of federal procedural lawmaking power at 
all.  The Rules assiduously avoid any mention of the preservation of documents 
in anticipation of litigation, presumably to avoid concerns that such rules would 
tread upon state-created substantive law causes of action for spoliation of 
evidence.  Yet over the past decade the lower federal courts have treated the 
silence of the Rules as an invitation to create a federal common law of 
preservation and spoliation.11  This common law of preservation and spoliation 
has addressed a need for judicial policing of spoliation of ESI.  However, it has 
done so while also engendering considerable dissention among the courts 
themselves12 and causing rancorous complaints from litigants about what they 
claim are the severe burdens of the legal obligations imposed by the case law on 
preservation.13 
The need for better information about preservation and discovery has never 
been greater.  The Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee has recently 
responded to the doctrinal chaos with proposed amendments addressing, among 
other things, preservation and discovery of documents and ESI in federal 
                                               
 7. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
 8. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 9. Id. at 558. 
 10. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and Sanctioning Pre-
litigation Spoilation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2006‒07 (2011).  This article 
will use “data,” “documents,” and “information” interchangeably to refer to both paper records and 
ESI. 
 11. Id. at 2005‒07. 
 12. As a recent study noted: 
Examples of conflicting holdings across and within jurisdictions include issues related to 
whether failure to issue a written legal-hold notice constitutes gross negligence per se, 
what preservation-related duties exist regarding potentially relevant evidence in the 
hands of third parties, whether a proportionality standard should be applied in deciding 
what information to retain, whether spoliation sanctions require a showing of negligence 
or a more stringent bad-faith standard, or whether sanctions should be imposed for the 
failure to properly preserve data without any need to show that the lost information was 
relevant or helpful to the requesting party. 
Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 93 (footnotes omitted). 
 13. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., PRESERVATION—MOVING THE 
PARADIGM 4 (2010); DISCOVERY SUBCOMM., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINI-
CONFERENCE ON PRESERVATION AND SANCTIONS 19‒20 (2011). 
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litigation.14  This activity comes amid widespread calls for rules reform arising 
out of frustration with the patchwork of case law that currently governs 
preservation and sanctions for spoliation in federal court litigation.15  While 
there has been considerable debate about the merits of various proposals to 
amend the Rules, there is consensus on the need for further empirical research 
on the magnitude and nature of the costs associated with civil litigation, 
including the costs of discovery and preservation. 
The growing awareness of the need for empirical data on the benefits and 
burdens of procedural rules has led to increasingly ambitious efforts to study 
certain aspects of the costs of civil litigation.  These include the Civil Rules 
Survey by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC),16 the Member Survey on Civil 
Practice by the ABA Section of Litigation,17 and the Litigation Cost Survey of 
Major Companies.18  These studies provide essentially no discussion, however, 
of the cost of preservation, despite its centrality to debates about the costs of 
discovery and the need for Rules reform.19  The only prior, serious study of 
preservation costs was limited to in-depth, qualitative interviews with eight 
companies.20 
Prior to the work presented herein, no research had ever gathered quantitative 
data on preservation costs from a large sample of litigants.21  This article seeks 
to shed some light on the layers of uncertainty in and about the process of 
discovery.  The parts that follow present new research results, propose new 
stylized facts about discovery, and tease out their implications for legal practice 
and Rules reform. 
                                               
 14. See Oliver H. Barber III, Upcoming Changes to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Modernizing Scope of Discovery and Clarifying Consequences of Failure to Preserve, LOUISVILLE 
B. ASS’N’S BRIEFS (Sept. 2014), http://www.stites.com/learning-center/articles/upcoming-
changes-to-federal-rules-of-civil-procedure-modernizing-scope.  Absent action by Congress to 
block the amendments, the amendments will take effect December 1, 2015. 
 15. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2034. 
 16. See generally Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2. 
 17. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: 
FULL REPORT § 11 (2009) [herein after ABA STUDY]. 
 18. See generally LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR 
COMPANIES (2010) [hereinafter LITIGATION COST SURVEY]. 
 19. See ABA STUDY, supra note 17, at 2; Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 1.  One reason 
for this is that prior studies have been surveys of outside counsel.  The costs of preservation 
activities tend to be borne directly by the client, rather than outside counsel, and often begin before 
a lawsuit is filed.  See William H.J. Hubbard, Preservation Costs Survey Final Report (Feb. 18, 
2014), http://www.regulations.gov (search by ID number: USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002-2201) 
[hereinafter Preservation Costs Survey Report]. 
 20. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at iii, 15 (“Our approach here was qualitative in 
nature because it was clear that gauging the magnitude of preservation expenses in individual cases 
would present some daunting hurdles.”). 
 21. Id. at 86 (“Despite the costs of preservation having become one of the most discussed 
topics in the legal press of late, we are not aware of any empirical research that has collected 
quantitative information about such costs across significant numbers of actual cases.”). 
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Part I briefly summarizes Rules and case law governing preservation 
obligations in federal civil litigation.  Part II describes original, empirical 
research conducted on the costs of preservation and discovery.  This study, 
referred to as the Preservation Costs Survey (Survey), is the first—and to date 
the only—systematic effort to measure the extent and costs of preservation 
activity across a cross-section of companies.  Although focused on preservation 
costs, this Survey collected quantitative data on the volume, timing, and cost of 
other aspects of discovery, particularly those aspects of discovery farthest 
removed from court oversight (i.e., collection and processing, as opposed to 
review and production).  It is also unique among quantitative studies in that it 
focuses on the costs of the client’s own discovery-related activities rather than 
the costs incurred by outside counsel retained to litigate cases. 
The Survey responded to a call from the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
for empirical data on the costs of preservation.22  The Survey was supported by 
an industry organization called the Civil Justice Reform Group, whose members 
include large companies concerned with the costs of preservation but, tellingly, 
could not quantify their own preservation costs.23  The Survey collected 
information from 128 companies and gathered detailed, case-level data on 
preservation activity in over 3,600 separate litigation matters.  Surveyed 
companies ranged from small companies without in-house litigation counsel to 
Fortune 100 companies who have entire staffs of attorneys and other 
professionals devoted full-time to compliance with litigation-related 
preservation obligations. 
Part III presents key findings from the research conducted and proposes three 
new stylized facts about preservation and discovery, complete with three 
accompanying metaphors: the discovery sombrero, the preservation iceberg, 
and the long tail of costs.  The usual progression of discovery activities in a given 
case begins with the preservation of information that may be relevant to ongoing 
or threatened litigation.  Next comes the collection of documents for processing 
and review.  Processing refers to actions such as decryption, decompression, and 
de-duplication of documents to render them amenable to review and to reduce 
redundancies and other unnecessary costs further downstream.  Review is the 
work lawyers conduct to determine relevance and privilege of the documents in 
discovery.  Production is the process of turning over to opposing counsel the 
relevant, non-privileged materials within the scope of discovery. 
Obvious quantitative questions immediately arise: how much of what is 
preserved is collected?  How much of what is collected is processed?  One might 
imagine a winnowing process whereby the parties begin with a large set of 
                                               
 22. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19.  Earlier drafts of portions of this 
article were shared with the Advisory Committee. 
 23. As noted in the Preservation Costs Survey Report submitted to the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules, “The Civil Justice Reform Group describes itself as an organization formed and 
directed by general counsel of Fortune 100 Companies concerned about America’s justice system.”  
Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 6 n.10. 
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documents that are preserved, which they gradually trim down to the materials 
most relevant to settlement, summary judgment, or trial, as in Figure 1. 
  




This Survey, however, indicates a different relationship between the volumes 
of data involved in preservation relative to the other stages.  The progression is 
not so much a discovery pyramid as it is a discovery sombrero, introduced in 
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FIGURE 2: THE DISCOVERY SOMBRERO 
 
 
The immediate implication of this fact is that preservation—a stage of 
discovery that to date has gone unmentioned in the Rules and is remote from 
judicial oversight—has the potential to be a source of substantial costs in the 
civil justice system. 
Part III.B introduces the “preservation iceberg,” which begins to unpack 
exactly how and where the huge data volumes being preserved for civil litigation 
impose costs on preserving parties.  Debates about the costs of preservation and 
the need for Rules reform tend to be framed by anecdotes about what this article 
refers to as the “fixed costs” of preservation.  An example of a “fixed cost” is 
the million dollars a large company spends on a computer system to facilitate 
the preservation of ESI.  Given the obvious self-interest of the parties offering 
such anecdotes, one might wonder whether such anecdotes exaggerate the costs 
of preservation. 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this research is that such anecdotes 
severely underestimate the total costs of preservation activity.  While a Fortune 
500 company might spend $4 million on computer systems, it is merely the “tip 
of the iceberg” of preservation costs, and, as with icebergs, the tip is a mere ten 
percent of the whole.  Anecdotes about these costing $4 million likely reflect 
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Why have the true costs of preservation evaded observation?  Some costs, 
such as the invoice for a new computer application, are easy to observe.  But this 
study reveals that the greatest cost of preservation activity is not the price tag of 
new technology, but the human cost in employee time diverted from business 
activities to litigation-related activities.  The costs associated with this diversion 
of human effort constitute over ninety percent of total preservation costs in the 
largest companies and essentially 100 percent of total preservation costs in 
smaller companies. 
Part III.C introduces the “long tail of costs,” a phenomenon that can 
harmonize the seemingly irreconcilable data and anecdotes that populate the 
rhetoric of procedural reform: on the one hand, there are documented accounts 
of preservation and discovery costing millions of dollars in cases that companies 
regularly litigate; and on the other hand, there are data showing that median costs 
are measured in the thousands, not millions, of dollars. 
Both accounts are true: the distribution of preservation costs is such that most 
litigation matters involve moderate costs, but the distribution is highly skewed, 
with a long but thin tail of extremely expensive litigation matters.  The skew is 
so great that even though cases with blockbuster costs are rare—maybe five 
percent of all litigation matters—they account for the majority of all costs.  
Interestingly, the data collected in this article on companies’ preservation costs 
is strikingly consistent with previous data collected on outside counsels’ 
litigation costs, which suggests that this “long tail of costs” reflects a deep 
phenomenon affecting all of litigation. 
Part IV discusses the relevance of the discovery sombrero, the preservation 
iceberg, and the long tail of litigation costs to policymaking and legal doctrine 
governing discovery.  While the first objective of this article is to introduce key, 
stylized facts on preservation and discovery, which are relevant to many 
questions in this field, the second objective is to explore how these stylized facts 
help identify the way forward in addressing three specific cleavages in the law. 
First, the discovery sombrero interacts in a surprising way with Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins24 and its progeny.  Current federal efforts to regulate 
preservation through federal common law need to account for the fact that much 
of what is regulated occurs outside the context of federal litigation.  For example, 
federal rules governing the conduct of preservation direct the behavior of parties 
who will ultimately find themselves in state, not federal, court.  This raises the 
specter of Erie.  Although objections have been raised against a federal rule on 
preservation because of Rules Enabling Act concerns, these concerns are 
precisely backwards.  If anything, federal rulemaking solves, rather than raises, 
an Erie infirmity. 
Second, the preservation iceberg interacts in an unexpected way with debates 
about the choice between reliance on legal reform and reliance on technological 
innovation to reduce costs associated with discovery.  Big businesses have 
                                               
 24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
2015] The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation 875 
claimed that legal change is needed to control costs that have multiplied due to 
technological change, while their opponents have argued that technology can 
also lower preservation and discovery costs.25  The research presented herein 
suggests that both of these arguments are misdirected.  Preservation costs are 
very high—indeed, even higher than proponents of legal reform have 
recognized—but most of the costs are human costs, rather than technology costs. 
Further, technology is not a substitute for legal reform because technological 
solutions are practical only for the largest companies where high-tech solutions 
justify their high price tag.  For smaller companies—and in this study, “smaller” 
includes companies with under 1,000 employees—technology plays a much 
smaller role in the preservation process.  From this point of view, legal 
innovation, rather than technological innovation, may be the best hope for 
controlling preservation costs of individuals, small businesses, and virtually 
everyone other than the largest and most sophisticated litigants. 
Third, the stark differences among cases involving different substantive 
fields—compare the typical scope of discovery in an antitrust case versus an 
employment discrimination case, or compare the information asymmetries in 
those cases with those in, say, contract cases—put constant pressure on the 
transsubstantive design of the Rules.  The long tail of costs, however, points the 
way to a Rules-based approach to controlling discovery that does not require the 
Rules to abandon a commitment to transsubstantive standards.  Given that most 
preservation and discovery costs are concentrated in a small share of cases, one 
can structure the Rules to set presumptive limits on discovery that leave most 
cases unaffected but facilitate party bargaining and judicial oversight in the 
fraction of cases where the issue of cost control may deserve careful attention. 
I.  LAW GOVERNING PRESERVATION AND DISCOVERY 
The Rules do not explicitly address preservation.  The Rules do, however, 
provide the framework for addressing discovery generally.  For example, Rule 
1 dictates that the Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”26  
Rule 26(b)(1) outlines the scope of discovery: “[p]arties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense.”27  Rule 26(b)(2) sets out the limits of permissible discovery.28  In 
particular, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) outlines the bases for limiting discovery and 
imposes a mandatory requirement on courts to limit discovery, even sua sponte, 
if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
                                               
 25. See ABA STUDY, supra note 17, at 110 (finding that defense counsels were less optimistic 
about technological advances improving cost efficiency than were plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
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benefit.”29  In this way, Rule “26(b)(2)(C) cautions that all permissible discovery 
must be measured against the yardstick of proportionality.”30 
While it appears these Rules present a set of guidelines for discovery that 
might arguably apply to preservation, these Rules have been by all accounts 
ineffective at providing meaningful guidance to courts and litigants on questions 
of preservation.31  Federal case law on preservation has largely ignored the Rules 
and has done little to settle the question of what needs to be preserved and by 
what standards a failure to preserve will be judged.  In fact, courts do not even 
agree on “whether a proportionality standard should be applied in deciding what 
information to retain.”32  In Pippins v. KPMG LLP,33 the court found the 
proportionality standard too “amorphous” to be useful and instead concluded 
that “[u]ntil a more precise definition is created by rule, prudence favors 
retaining all relevant materials.”34 
Of course, a few principles governing preservation are fairly well-settled.  For 
example, the duty to preserve relevant data attaches when a party reasonably 
anticipates litigation.35  Failure to take appropriate steps to preserve data can 
subject a party to sanctions, which a federal court may impose under its inherent 
power.36 
One key step—perhaps the key step—in complying with the duty to preserve 
is the issuance of a litigation hold.  A “litigation hold” is a set of actions taken 
by a company to comply with preservation obligations in a litigation matter.37  
A litigation hold will define the scope of documents and data that must be 
preserved.38  A “litigation-hold notice” is an instruction from legal counsel to an 
employee that the employee must retain all documents and data in her custody 
that are within the scope of the litigation hold; for example, in a products liability 
case, the scope might be all documents relating to the safety of a particular 
                                               
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
 30. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010). 
 31. See DISCOVERY SUBCOMM., supra note 13, at 2‒3; see also LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 
ET AL., supra note 13, at 11 (noting that “only two courts have considered the application of 
proportionality to the scope of preservation pursuant to FRCP Rule 26(b)(2)(C) although neither 
court specifically analyzed its application”). 
 32. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 93 (citations omitted). 
 33. No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 WL 4701849, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011). 
 34. Id. at 6 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 35. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Sec., 
LLC, 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 
F.Supp.2d 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“It is well established that the duty to preserve arises when 
a party knows or should know that certain evidence is relevant to pending or future litigation.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1008. 
 37. Stephanie F. Stacy, Litigation Holds: Ten Tips in Ten Minutes, http://www.ned.uscourts. 
gov/internetDocs/cle/2010-07/LitigationHoldTopTen.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
 38. Id. 
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product that the company produces.39  The usual practice is to send a litigation-
hold notice to the set of “key players” who are likely to have data relevant to the 
dispute in question.40  As described below in Part II, one primary measure of 
preservation activity is the number of litigation-hold notices issued. 
However, many questions regarding preservation remain unsettled.  Courts 
have diverged on questions such as “whether failure to issue a written legal-hold 
notice constitutes gross negligence per se”41 and “what preservation-related 
duties exist regarding potentially relevant evidence in the hands of third 
parties.”42  Most notably, courts have not even converged on a standard for the 
two essential prerequisites for imposing spoliation sanctions: the alleged 
spoliator’s state of mind and prejudice to the other party. 
As to the former, most courts require bad faith—in the form of intentional 
destruction of data to prevent its use in litigation—before imposing serious 
sanctions such as entering judgment against the offending party or giving an 
adverse inference instruction to the jury.43  But some courts explicitly disclaim 
any requirement of bad faith.44  Further, some courts are willing to infer 
negligence from the mere fact that any data whatsoever was lost.45  This split is 
complicated by the idiosyncratic terminology applied by some courts that 
distinguish between “willfulness” and bad faith, such that a merely volitional 
act—such as good faith deletion of data without awareness of its potential 
relevance to litigation—is “willful” spoliation.46  As for the standard for finding 
prejudice, some courts will presume relevance and prejudice from gross 
                                               
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 93 (citations omitted). 
 42. Id. (citation omitted). 
 43. See, e.g., Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F.Supp.2d 598, 607, 653 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (imposing sanctions including an adverse inference instruction against defendants that 
intentionally deleted emails after a duty to preserve had arisen). 
 44. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding 
that negligent spoliation is sufficient to incur sanctions). 
 45. See id. (“Once the duty to preserve attaches, any destruction of documents is, at a 
minimum, negligent.”).  For example, in Pension Committee v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 
a party had failed to produce a number of emails that were later discovered in another production.  
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  The court stated that, “[t]his, alone, demonstrates 
that the [party’s] effort to find and produce all relevant documents was insufficient.”  Id. at 489.  
See Michael W. Deyo, Deconstructing Pension Committee: The Evolving Rules of Evidence 
Spoliation and Sanctions in the Electronic Discovery Era, 75 ALB. L. REV. 305 (2011/2012) 
(discussing Pension Committee in detail). See Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 
F.Supp.2d 997, 1007 (D. Ariz. 2011) (rejecting this approach as “too inflexible”). 
 46. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 194 (D.S.C. 2008) (holding that if the 
spoliation is “willful” adverse inference instructions are appropriate “even in the absence of bad 
faith,” and that sanctions of dismissal and default judgment require a showing of “bad faith”). 
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negligence or bad faith,47 while others will make such an inference only from 
bad faith,48 or perhaps not at all.49 
II.  THE PRESERVATION COSTS SURVEY 
The Preservation Costs Survey is the first systematic, quantitative study of 
preservation costs across a spectrum of companies that are engaged in 
preservation activities.  Part II.A discusses the key constraints that drove the 
design of the Survey.  Prior to this study, these factors had combined to prevent 
any systematic collection of preservation costs.  Part II.B describes the Survey 
methodology, and Part II.C describes the sampled companies.50 
A.  Obstacles to Empirical Work on Preservation 
In order to measure the costs associated with preservation obligations, this 
Survey had to overcome a number of challenges that prevented prior research 
from determining the nature and scale of preservation costs.51 Indeed, a 
prerequisite to gathering any quantitative data was identifying which costs of 
preservation are even susceptible to practical measurement.  Thus, the first phase 
of the survey design focused on in-depth interviews with personnel at a pilot 
group of companies.  These interviews sought to identify which aspects of the 
costs of preservation are most amenable to study and which would be difficult, 
or as a practical matter impossible, to estimate.  Not surprisingly, every company 
                                               
 47. Pension Comm., 685 F.Supp.2d at 467 (“Relevance and prejudice may be presumed when 
the spoliating party acted in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner.”). 
 48. See, e.g., D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., No. 06-687(JDB/JMF), 2010 WL 3324964, 
at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010).  The court held: 
When a party, for example, has acted negligently and lost evidence, [an adverse] 
inference does not flow naturally from the facts. When a person purposefully destroys 
evidence, it is reasonable to infer that he did so to keep it from being used against him 
. . . . [When the action was negligent or reckless,] a court cannot logically infer the intent 
of what a party did from its behavior because its behavior was unthinking. 
Id. 
 49. Orbit One Commc’ns v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding 
that before addressing culpability “a court considering a sanctions motion must make a threshold 
determination whether any material that has been destroyed was likely relevant even for purposes 
of discovery”). 
 50. As noted above, earlier versions of portions of this article were submitted as a public 
comment to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in the form of the Preservation Costs Survey 
Report.  The Preservation Costs Survey Report contains details on a number of Survey results not 
discussed in this article.  This article develops doctrinal and prescriptive analysis that was beyond 
the scope of the Report submitted to the Advisory Committee.  The discussion of the background 
and methodology of the Survey, however, is largely unchanged in this article from the earlier 
version in the Report, although in some places, the Report goes into more detail on the finer points 
of the methodology and data.  For this reason, the article will include notes directing the reader to 
relevant portions of the Preservation Costs Survey Report that contain details related to the 
discussion in the text herein. 
 51. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 9‒13. 
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interviewed for the Survey expressed that estimating the costs of preservation is 
difficult.52 
There are several reasons for this difficulty.  First, identifying systems and 
their cost requires time-consuming, individualized investigation of each 
company.53  Each company has different computer systems, different internal 
business flow, and different technology needs.  While an “off-the-shelf” solution 
from an outside vendor comes with an invoiced price, the full cost of that 
solution includes company time and resources for project bidding, 
implementation, and maintenance over time.  Systems that are developed in-
house are even harder to price. 
Second, individualized investigation is required to ensure that the costs being 
measured are properly attributable to preservation obligations, rather than other 
motivations.  To address this concern, the author relied on detailed, in-depth 
interviews with companies to accurately identify specific systems whose sole 
purpose was compliance with preservation obligations.  As a consequence of 
this approach, the Survey data on these costs generates a conservative estimate 
of the total costs of technologies adopted in response to preservation burdens. 
Third, the human cost of preservation-related activity in terms of lost work 
time has never before been measured.  One major cost of preservation 
obligations is the lost employee time spent complying with duties imposed 
through the issuance of litigation-hold notices.  Because the cost of compliance 
with litigation-hold notices is dispersed throughout a company, and because the 
cost primarily takes the form of lost time rather than monetary payments, 
measuring the magnitude of this cost is difficult.54  The time and energy that 
employees must divert towards preservation is never recorded or compensated, 
unlike the time spent by dedicated lawyers, such as outside counsel.55 
The strategy to measure these costs was to collect detailed information on the 
number of matters with litigation holds and the number of employees subject to 
each litigation hold at a sample of companies.  The author combined these counts 
of employees subject to litigation holds with estimates of time lost per employee 
and the hourly cost of employee time, to quantify in dollar terms the value of 
employee time that is diverted from business purposes to compliance with 
preservation obligations. 
                                               
 52. See also Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at xix (“Most interviewees did not hesitate 
to confess that their preservation costs had not been systematically tracked in any way and that they 
were unclear as to how such tracking might be accomplished.”). 
 53. Id. at 85. 
 54. See id. at xviii. 
 55. See id. at 85. 
Part of the reason for a lack of existing information in this area appears to be that much 
of preservation involves expenditures incurred internally, such as the costs of IT staff 
time, law department attorney and paralegal time, other employees’ time (such as the 
effort required of custodians to comply with legal-hold notices), and purchases and 
licensing of applications and hardware to handle preservation. 
Id. 
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Fourth, companies are unable or reluctant to share sensitive and confidential 
information about litigation-related costs.56  In many cases, companies simply 
do not have the information or cannot gather it at reasonable cost.57  This 
reluctance is also due to companies’ concern that disclosing information about 
their litigation experiences and expenses could be used strategically against them 
in litigation.58  For this reason, all information collected for the Preservation 
Costs Survey was gathered subject to assurances of strict confidentiality and 
anonymity for each survey participant.59 
Fifth, many costs associated with preservation are diffuse and cannot be 
directly measured.  For example, while the lost time of affected employees can 
be measured, other costs remain unmeasured, such as delays in basic business 
processes like rolling out new computers to employees due to concerns about 
the preservation of data stored on due-to-be-retired hard drives.60  Thus, the 
preservation costs measured by the Survey do not exhaust the universe of costs 
imposed by preservation obligations. 
B.  Survey Methodology 
The Survey involved three phases, lasting from late 2011 through early 
2014.61  The Survey was done with the support and assistance of the Civil Justice 
Reform Group (CJRG), a group of in-house counsel at large, U.S. corporations.62  
CJRG asked a number of large companies to participate in the Survey and 
coordinated with other business associations (including small and medium-sized 
businesses) to request that their members participate in the Survey.  This 
provided unprecedented access to information about companies’ experiences 
with preservation and discovery; as noted above, it is usually impossible to 
                                               
 56. See id. at 4. 
 57. Only fourteen percent of Survey respondents stated that they track the costs of their 
litigation holds.  See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 12 n.18. 
 58. See Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 4. 
 59. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 13 (explaining further the steps 
to protect anonymity and data integrity).  For example, in some cases, exact numbers are rounded 
or topcoded (e.g., employee counts larger than 100,000 are reported as “> 100,000”) to protect 
anonymity.  Id. 
 60. Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 86.  The report explained: 
[T]here may be economic impacts resulting from a decision not to adopt certain IT 
products (such as instant messaging or social-networking platforms) that might present 
significant difficulties when preserving information, from not implementing more-
efficient data systems due to the need to maintain older legacy platforms and processes, 
from slower computer-system performance caused by halting the routine deletion of 
obsolete information in transactional databases, or from a reduced ability to recover lost 
but nevertheless important data due to a shift from a long-term data backup process to a 
short-term disaster-recovery system primarily because of preservation concerns. 
Id. 
 61. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 13‒16 (discussing details on the 
Survey methodology). 
 62. Id. at 6 n.10. 
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collect information on litigation-related costs from companies.  Indeed, even 
with CJRG helping to convince companies to participate, a major component of 
survey design and promotion was to provide detailed, credible assurances of 
confidentiality and anonymity to respondents. 
While the sponsorship of CJRG was essential to the viability of this project, 
there is no question that CJRG is an advocacy organization, and the author was 
compensated for his time and expenses associated with designing the survey, 
interviewing respondents, and processing response data.63  Because of this, the 
methodology involved steps taken to protect the independence of the research 
and insulate the survey results from any outside influence.  CJRG agreed not to 
participate in the design of the survey questions or access the data collected in 
the course of the survey.  Nor was CJRG involved in the analysis of the data.  
Further, CJRG retained no interest in or oversight of the use or publication of 
results in this article.  Thus, to be absolutely clear, all of the arguments and 
conclusions herein are the author’s alone. 
Given the complexity of the topic, and the largely unprecedented nature of a 
study focused on preservation costs, the Survey utilized a three-phase design.  
Phase I involved a set of four, in-depth case studies of large companies.  These 
case studies involved both qualitative interviews and requests for quantitative 
data to be used for statistical analysis.  One important aspect of Phase I was 
developing the survey instrument.  The development process began with an 
extensive written survey coupled with follow-up interviews to obtain feedback 
on the clarity and practicability of each question.  This information was used to 
draft the survey instruments used with larger samples of companies during 
Phases II and III. 
Phase II broadened the sample of companies to thirteen and continued to 
employ an in-depth, case-study approach.  A revised questionnaire was 
combined with interviews and the collection of matter-level datasets of 
preservation activity in order to create as complete as possible a picture of the 
sources and amounts of preservation costs for large companies.  As used in this 
article, “matter-level datasets” are datasets in which information on the number 
of litigation holds is provided for each individual litigation matter.  Often, a 
“matter” is a lawsuit, but not always.  Litigation matters include both filed and 
anticipated lawsuits.  For this reason, this article uses the term “matter” rather 
than “case.”  In addition to survey and interview responses, Phase II yielded six 
unique databases of matter- and employee-level preservation activity within 
specific companies.  These databases of preservation activity were provided on 
a strictly confidential, anonymous basis.  These datasets together provided 
information on over 3,600 separate litigation matters involving over 770,000 
                                               
 63. As noted above, CJRG’s interest in sponsoring this research was to respond to calls for 
empirical data on preservation costs from members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, who 
were considering proposals to amend the Rules to address preservation.  The Preservation Costs 
Survey Report took no position on specific proposals, but did conclude that preservation costs were 
large enough to merit attention from the rulemakers.  Id. at 47. 
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litigation hold notices issued to individual employees in individual matters.  
They are the first large samples of case-specific preservation activity data ever 
compiled for research purposes. 
Phase III involved a shortened survey questionnaire and no interviews or 
requests for data.  This Phase was deliberately designed to be distributed to a 
larger number of companies, which would allow them to respond with a much 
smaller investment in human resources.  The goal of Phase III was to obtain 
survey responses from a large sample of companies, including small and 
medium-sized businesses, in order to draw inferences about preservation activity 
in a broader cross-section of civil litigants.  Phase III was publicized to 
companies through groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers, 
Lawyers for Civil Justice, and the Association of Corporate Counsel.  The 
surveys could be completed on a printable form or by an online survey 
instrument hosted on research.net.  The Phase III survey was open from October 
2013 to January 2014.64  By the conclusion of Phase III, a total of 128 unique 
companies had completed survey questionnaires.65 
Although this study is by far the most rigorous survey of preservation costs 
ever conducted, this study’s methodology, by its very nature, cannot guarantee 
a representative sample of all companies with preservation obligations.66  As 
with any survey, this study could include only those who were willing and able 
to respond.  Nonetheless, the Survey results provide several indications that the 
sample may be representative of the larger population of companies. 
First, the results from each phase of the Survey are remarkably consistent with 
each other, despite substantial differences in the process by which companies 
were solicited for participation and the degree of effort required by the 
companies to complete their participation.  This suggests that the amount of 
effort required to participate is not strongly correlated with the characteristics of 
the company. 
Second, many of the patterns that one would predict to see in the data based 
on strong a priori justifications do, in fact, appear in the data.  For example, 
smaller companies have very few (often zero) litigation attorneys and report 
                                               
 64. Two surveys were returned in February 2014. They are included in the results reported 
below.  Excluding them has little effect on the reported results.  See id. at 15 n.21. 
 65. The Phase III questionnaire is reproduced in the Appendix of the Preservation Costs 
Survey Report.  See id. at 55‒59. 
 66. Compare Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at xiii–xiv (“We asked participants to 
choose a minimum of five cases in which they produced data and electronic documents to another 
party as part of an e-discovery request. . . . Because the participating companies and cases do not 
constitute a representative sample of corporations and litigation, we cannot draw generalizations 
from our findings that apply to all corporate litigants or all discovery productions.”), with 
Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 6 (“The Survey ultimately collected 
information from 128 companies from a wide spectrum of industries.  These companies vary from 
small companies without in-house litigation counsel to Fortune 100 companies who have entire 
staffs of attorneys and other professionals devoted full-time to preservation work.”). 
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dramatically fewer active cases.67  This pattern might not emerge if only the 
most sophisticated (or most embroiled in litigation) smaller companies 
participated in the Survey. 
Third, unlike prior studies that also depended on the willingness of companies 
to provide data on discovery costs (Litigation Cost Survey) or to provide 
interview responses on preservation (Where the Money Goes), the Preservation 
Costs Survey did not allow participating companies to select specific cases for 
inclusion in the sample.  Rather, the questionnaire asked only for information 
about cases in the aggregate, and the requests for databases of preservation 
activity included all litigation matters with litigation holds (excluding asbestos 
matters).  Thus, the Preservation Costs Survey provides analysis of the first truly 
representative samples of the within-company distribution of litigation activity. 
C.  Sample Characteristics 
The 128 survey respondents represent a broad cross-section of companies in 
the United States.68  The participating companies come from a wide variety of 
industries.69  The most heavily represented categories were health care, 
insurance, technology, and conglomerate, each with at least ten respondents. 
The number of people employed worldwide by each company ranges from 18 
to over 100,000.70  Importantly, although large companies were the focus of 
Phases I and II, smaller companies are well represented in the sample.  About a 
quarter of all respondents (twenty-four percent) have 1,000 or fewer employees 
worldwide; the same proportion have 500 or fewer U.S. employees, the 
threshold usually used to define a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME).71  
The largest companies, those with over 100,000 employees worldwide, make up 





                                               
 67. See infra note 94. 
 68. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 17‒19 (discussing the survey 
respondents and data collected in further detail). 
 69. The categories are: Automobiles & Parts, Banks, Chemicals, Conglomerate, Financial 
Services, Food & Beverage, Health Care, Industrial Goods & Services, Insurance, Media, Oil & 
Gas, Other, Personal & Household Goods, Retail, Technology, Telecommunications, Travel & 
Leisure, and Utilities. 
 70. In order to protect the anonymity of some respondents, exact employee counts above 
100,000 are not reported. 
 71. This article refers to companies with 1,000 or fewer employees as “smaller companies.” 
 72. Herein, the author will occasionally refer to companies with close to or more than 100,000 
employees worldwide as “large companies.”  Companies with 1,001–10,000 employees made up 
twenty-nine percent of the sample; companies with 10,001–100,000 employees made up thirty 
percent of the sample. 
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TABLE 1: SURVEY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel A: Employees, Lawsuits, and Litigation Hold Matters 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Total employees 43,454 8,000 18 > 100,000 
U.S. employees 21,678 6,100 0 > 100,000 
In-house litigation attorneys 12 4 0 > 50 
Active suits 1,399 33 0 > 10,000 
Open matters with holds 686 33 0 > 10,000 
 
Panel B: Share with Preservation Resources or Practices 
 Issues litigation holds notices 100%  
 Has formal preservation policies 84%  
 Tracks litigation holds and notices 63%  
 Has e-discovery team 40%  
 Has legal IT group 31%  
 
The volume of litigation varies widely across these companies; the number of 
suits currently active varies from 0 to over 10,000.73  Asbestos litigation was 
specifically excluded from the Survey.74  There is also great variation in the 
number of litigation holds that companies report as active.75  The number of in-
                                               
 73. In order to protect the anonymity of some respondents, exact counts of lawsuits and 
litigation holds above 10,000 are not reported.  Five companies did not report numbers of suits, and 
seven companies did not report numbers of matters with holds. 
 74. While asbestos litigation remains an important part of the federal civil docket, it is sui 
generis with respect to preservation; at this point in the history of asbestos litigation, virtually every 
document in the possession of a company defendant that could possibly be relevant to asbestos 
claims has long ago been preserved and produced. 
 75. As the duty to preserve may arise before a lawsuit is filed, the number of matters subject 
to litigation holds may be greater than the number of lawsuits.  Conversely, a single litigation hold 
may suffice for a number of related lawsuits, and thus a company may have fewer litigation holds 
than lawsuits. 
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house litigation attorneys ranges from zero to over fifty.76  Most in-house 
litigation teams are small—the median is four, and seventeen out of the 128 
companies have no in-house litigation counsel.  See Table 1.77 
Some basic Survey results are unsurprising.78  Consistent with the great 
weight of anecdotal evidence and prior qualitative studies, surveyed companies 
generally reported significant preservation burdens, although some reported 
little or none at all.79  In interviews, companies expressed that they are 
deliberately “overinclusive” or “overpreserve” to protect themselves against the 
great uncertainty associated with the current law of preservation.80  Government 
investigations, rather than private lawsuits, ranked first in terms of preservation-
related problems.  This is unsurprising, given the often sweeping scope and 
indefinite duration of government investigations, which may entail incredibly 
broad requests for information. 
III.  THREE STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT LITIGATION 
A.  The Discovery Sombrero 
Perhaps the most basic finding of the Survey was that most respondents did 
not know the extent of their preservation activity or what fraction of data that is 
put on litigation hold is ever collected, let alone reviewed or used, in the course 
of discovery.  Those that did reported on average that perhaps half (fifty-one 
percent) of all data that is preserved is never processed and reviewed.81  This 
result is consistent with a recent survey by an e-discovery vendor, which found 
that for most companies, legal holds proceed to collection less than half the 
time.82 
For larger companies, the drop-off from preservation to collection, 
processing, and review is even steeper.  Figure 3 presents data from a large 
company on the number of custodians involved in three stages of discovery: 
                                               
 76. In order to protect the anonymity of some respondents, exact counts of litigation attorneys 
above fifty are not reported. Three companies did not report the number of litigation attorneys. 
 77. For Total Employees and U.S. Employees, N = 126. Median numbers of employees are 
rounded by up to one percent to protect respondent anonymity. 
 78. In addition to the details noted here, the Preservation Costs Survey Report provides many 
additional results.  See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 20‒43. 
 79. See id. at 20‒21 (finding that over seventy-nine percent (102 of 128) of respondents 
reported a “great extent” or “moderate extent” of burdens from preservation activity.).  See also 
Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at xix (“All interviewees reported that preservation had 
evolved into a significant portion of their companies’ total e-discovery expenditures.”). 
 80. Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 46.  See also Where the Money Goes, 
supra note 5, at 92 (“If there was one consistent theme in what we heard, it revolved around 
complaints of a lack of understandable legal authority and guidance that could be comfortably relied 
on when making preservation decisions.”). 
 81. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 43‒44. 
 82. LEGAL HOLD AND DATA PRESERVATION BENCHMARK SURVEY 2013 16 (2013) (finding 
that for “64 percent of respondents, legal holds progress to collection less than half the time”). 
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preservation, collection, and processing.  Out of over 5,000 custodians placed 
on litigation hold, and thus subject to preservation obligations, fewer than ten 
percent ultimately see their data collected, let alone processed. 
 
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF CUSTODIANS SUBJECT TO PRESERVATION,  
COLLECTION, AND PROCESSING OF AN ANONYMOUS LARGE COMPANY 
 
 
Figure 4 presents a similar picture with non-anonymous data provided in 
public testimony on behalf of Microsoft.  In Figure 4, the unit of measurement 
is the quantity of data preserved, collected, and processed rather than the number 
of custodians subject to those activities.  The Microsoft data also illustrates how 
little data, relative to the quantity preserved, is ever used in litigation.83  From 
this, the shape of the discovery sombrero, illustrated above in Figure 2, is 
apparent: a wide “brim” of preservation, and a much narrower, tapering set of 




                                               
 83. Testimony of David M. Howard on behalf of Microsoft Corp., Transcript of Public 




 84. See supra Figure 2.  From Figure 4, it is clear that Figure 2 is not to scale.  If this were 
drawn to scale, the brim would be even wider, and the top would be very narrow. 
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FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF PAGES OR DATA EQUIVALENT (IN 1000S) PRESERVED, 
COLLECTED, AND PROCESSED FOR MICROSOFT CORPORATION 
 
 
As the disproportionate bulk associated with preservation becomes apparent, 
the sense of urgency for new Rules governing preservation becomes obvious.  
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The answer requires one to approach the question of discovery from the 
perspective of the preserving party.  This is an ex ante perspective, in which the 
preserving party must make decisions before any uncertainty about the legal 
claim is resolved.85  From this perspective, preservation is not part of litigation 
at all, and at this point in time the preserving party is not dealing with “lawsuits,” 
but with “disputes.”  These disputes may or may not turn into lawsuits, let alone 
federal lawsuits.86  To illustrate this idea, Figure 5 divides the discovery 
sombrero by where the dispute ends up, rather than by stage of discovery.87 
                                               
 85. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 639; Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 
BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 100 (2009). 
 86. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2007‒08 (discussing the level of foreseeability needed to 
trigger the duty to preserve). 
 87. See supra Figure 5.  Note that the dashed line indicates that, among matters that end up 
in state or federal court, some preservation occurs before the matter becomes a filed lawsuit, and 
some preservation occurs after.  The remaining stages all occur after filing, of course.  Note, too, 
that as before, the sections of the sombrero are not to scale. 
Disputes settled 
out of court 
Pre-filing preservation 
Disputes that end 
up in federal court 
Disputes that end 
up in state court 
Disputes dropped  
without suit 
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Survey respondents generally confirmed that a substantial portion of 
preservation activity is conducted in the absence of a filed lawsuit.88  In contrast, 
collection, processing, review, and production will usually occur in the context 
of litigation.89  This is the crucial difference between stages of discovery that 
federal courts have long regulated under the Rules, generally with success,90 and 
preservation, a phase of discovery that currently vexes courts and litigants alike. 
B.  The Preservation Iceberg 
This section focuses on the costs associated with preservation specifically.  
The costs of preservation fall into two broad categories, which will be referred 
to as fixed costs and variable costs. 
Fixed costs are costs that do not depend on the volume of preservation activity 
or the number of cases a company faces.91  These costs are “fixed” because they 
do not arise in the context of individual litigation matters, but represent a 
company’s ongoing expenses.  For example, the costs of developing a repository 
for e-mails preserved in anticipation of litigation will exist whether the company 
faces 100 lawsuits or 1000 lawsuits; the specific scope of preservation rules or 
the number of holds that will have to be issued will have little effect on this 
cost.92  Fixed costs include the costs of maintaining a staff of attorneys, IT 
specialists, and other professionals devoted to preservation activity, as well as 
the costs of automated systems to manage litigation holds and preserve data.93  
Virtually all prior reported information on the costs of preservation reflect only 
the fixed costs of preservation-related technology. 
Variable costs of preservation are costs that arise in the context of individual 
litigation matters, and thus vary with the volume of preservation activity.  The 
primary variable cost is the time that non-legal employees subject to litigation-
hold obligations must divert from business activities to compliance with a 
litigation hold.  This lost time is a variable cost because the time spent by an 
employee on litigation holds increases as either the number of holds rises or as 
the complexity of each hold rises. 
The Preservation Costs Survey sought to quantify both fixed and variable 
costs of preservation.  While collecting specific, quantitative estimates of fixed 
                                               
 88. Most companies do not track these numbers, but a few companies did provide such data.  
These reports ranged from forty-four to seventy-seven percent of holds not being associated with 
active litigation.  Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 43. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 69‒70. 
 91. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 7‒11 (discussing in more detail 
fixed and variable costs). 
 92. See Where the Money Goes, supra note 5, at 86 (“[P]reservation responsibilities can 
sometimes involve enterprise-level costs, such as would be incurred with the implementation of an 
automatic legal-hold tool.  Such applications are certainly costly and have an observable price tag, 
but the expenditures are spread across all of the company’s present and future preservation needs.”). 
 93. See id. at 85. 
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costs was infeasible for Phase III of the Survey, the author collected information 
on fixed costs in interviews with a number of large companies in Phases I and 
II.  These interviews provided detailed information on several categories of fixed 
costs. 
With respect to fixed costs associated with personnel, these companies all had 
legal IT or e-discovery groups with attorneys and paralegals devoted full- or 
part-time to preservation activity.  On average, the companies had two attorneys 
and four paralegals or other legal professionals working full-time in a dedicated 
legal IT or e-discovery group. 
With respect to the fixed costs of technology, these companies also provided 
estimates of the costs of automated preservation systems that ranged from 
hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of dollars per system.  One important 
type of system in this area is the automated litigation-hold management system.  
These systems automate the process of distributing, tracking, and monitoring 
litigation-hold notices that are created by in-house counsel.  The largest fixed 
costs, however, are associated with the preservation of data itself.  Every large 
company surveyed has a diverse set of systems used to address preservation 
obligations.  Such an array of systems is necessary due to the large variety of 
types of ESI, many of which have distinct business purposes and are used and 
stored in different ways on a company’s computer systems. 
These reports suggest that for large companies, the per-year fixed costs 
associated with preservation activity run into the millions of dollars.  Table 2 
presents a rough but conservative calculation based on Survey results.  The total 
(measurable) fixed costs of preservation for a single, large company exceed $2.5 
million per year.  For smaller companies, though, fixed costs could be essentially 
zero.  Most smaller companies do not report having a dedicated e-discovery 
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TABLE 2: APPROXIMATE FIXED COSTS OF PRESERVATION FOR A 




A legal IT and/or e-discovery team $1,000,000 
Litigation-hold management system (implementation cost 
amortized over a 5 year expected life) 
$160,000 
Maintenance of litigation-hold management system  $150,000 
Automated data preservation system (implementation cost 
amortized over a 5 year expected life) 
$1,000,000 














Legal IT Team E-Discovery
Team
Formal Policies Hold Tracking
System
1-1,000 1,001-10,000 10,001-100,000 > 100,000
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This striking difference is likely due to the simple fact that smaller companies 
face fewer lawsuits.94  The fixed investments of many large companies benefit 
from large economies of scale.95  By leveraging legal and technical expertise and 
automation, investment in these fixed costs lowers the per-matter (variable) cost 
of preservation activities.  However, the high up-front investment is only 
justified by a large volume of litigation.  As Figure 6 shows, while the very 
largest companies almost uniformly use in-house preservation experts for 
managing litigation holds, virtually none of the smallest companies have 
separate legal IT or e-discovery staff.  Similarly, automated litigation-hold 
tracking software is virtually standard practice among large companies but is 
uncommon among smaller companies. 
As high as the fixed costs of preservation may be, the largest share of 
preservation costs is variable: the costs in human time and effort to address 
preservation obligations on a case-by-case basis.  Individual employees placed 
on hold or otherwise asked to engage in preservation activities must divert time 
and attention away from normal business activities.  In this respect, a day spent 
responding to litigation-hold notices is just as significant a drain on worker 
productivity as a sick day. 
Prior to this Survey, the magnitude of this aspect of preservation costs was 
unknown.96  The following calculation is used to determine the magnitude of 
these costs: multiply the number of litigation matters per year,97 times the 
number of employees on litigation hold per matter,98 times the number of hours 
                                               
 94. Companies with 1–1,000 employees reported an average of 27 active lawsuits (scaled 
proportionally to company size) at the time of the survey.  Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra 
note 19, at 33 tbl.8. Companies with 1,001–10,000 employees reported an average of 228 lawsuits; 
companies with 10,001–100,000 employees reported an average of 2,563; and companies with 
more than 100,000 employees reported an average of 3,404.  Id. 
 95. For example, one interviewed company spent around one million dollars to implement 
and maintain software to assist in indexing and searching preserved data, but the interviewee saw 
this cost as a fraction of the savings it has generated.  Id. at 34 n.52. 
 96. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 28‒31 (discussing in more detail 
the calculation of the variable costs of preservation). 
 97. This number was taken directly from data reported in responses to Phase III of the Survey. 
 98. This figure was derived from Phase I and Phase II companies that provided detailed data 
based on litigation-hold tracking software.  Based on the companies that provided data for this 
calculation, about 0.12% of employees on average are subject to a hold for each litigation matter.  
This estimate was applied to all companies, with a minimum of five employees per hold for smaller 
companies.  As a check on this latter figure, an analysis was conducted of employment cases, 
defined in the Survey as employment discrimination and retaliation cases, to test the validity of 
extrapolation from larger companies to smaller companies.  Unlike certain categories of litigation 
that uniquely affect large companies (such as antitrust), employment litigation is a risk for 
companies of all sizes, and typical employment suits at large companies look very much like 
employment suits at smaller companies in terms of stakes and numbers of “key players.”  Focusing 
only on employment litigation data indicates that the assumption that smaller companies have an 
average of five employees on hold per litigation matter is actually a conservative estimate.  Id. at 
36‒37. 
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per year a worker will spend on the litigation hold,99 times the average salary per 
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The estimates, broken down by company size, appear in Table 3.  For 
companies of all sizes, the costs in lost employee time are significant.  For the 
smallest companies in the Survey, the costs average over $12,000 per company 
per year.  The estimate of costs for the largest companies exceeds $38.6 million 
per company per year.  In sum, the two or three million dollars that a large 
company might spend in a year on preservation-related systems may be no more 














                                               
 99. This could include time spent reading, confirming receipt, and asking questions about a 
litigation-hold notice; time spent changing personal device settings and other work practices to 
comply with the litigation-hold notice; and time spent reviewing electronic and paper files to mark, 
copy, or set aside files for preservation.  The calculation uses an estimate of three hours per 
employee per year spent on each litigation hold based on estimates reported by interviewed 
companies; however, no surveyed company had a precise estimate.  As the Survey found, few 
companies track this type of cost. 
 100. This figure, $52.20/hour, is the average hourly wage of workers in management 
occupations (across all sectors and all business sizes) provided by the latest data from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.  See May 2012 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2012/may/oes_nat.htm#11-0000 (last 
visited April 19, 2015). 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATED PER-COMPANY COSTS OF EMPLOYEE TIME LOST TO 
LITIGATION HOLDS, BY COMPANY SIZE101 










Time Cost  
per Year 
1–1,000 16 5 240 $12,528 
1,001–10,000 249 11 8,217 $428,927 
10,001–
100,000 
1,245 71 265,185 $13,842,657 
> 100,000 1,333 185 739,815 $38,618,343 
 
C.  The Long Tail of Costs 
One question that existing, yet entirely anecdotal, evidence cannot answer is 
whether the cases that have high preservation costs are typical or atypical.  There 
have been many anecdotes suggesting that preservation burdens are large, and 
many anecdotes suggesting that they are not large.102  The Survey data reveals 
that these conflicting anecdotes do not pose a credibility contest between two 
contrary accounts.  Instead, these divergent anecdotes on cost reflect different 
aspects of the same phenomenon—an enormous amount of preservation activity 
that is very unevenly distributed across litigation matters.  This is the context in 
which individual experiences with the costs of preservation must be understood. 
Detailed, case-by-case data was collected on litigation holds from six 
companies.  These data sets together include information on over 3,600 separate 
litigation matters and over 770,000 individual litigation-hold notices.  The data 
from a representative company appears in Figure 7; histograms for the remaining 
five companies look essentially the same.  This company’s dataset covers 390 
distinct matters representing actual or anticipated civil litigation.  For each 
matter, the dataset provides the number of individuals subject to a litigation hold. 
                                               
 101. Columns (2) and (3) are averages within the company size categories in column (1).  
Column (4) is the product of column (2) and column (3) times 3 hours per employee-hold.  Column 
(5) is column (4) times $52.20 per hour. 
 102. See supra notes 2‒3. 
2015] The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation 895 
Figure 7 shows the frequency with which litigation matters involve a given 
number of employees subject to holds.  For example, the left-most vertical bar 
in Figure 7 represents the number of matters with twenty employees or fewer on 
hold, the next bar indicates the number of matters with twenty-one to forty 
employees on hold, and so on.103 
 
FIGURE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES ON HOLD PER MATTER OF A  
REPRESENTATIVE LARGE COMPANY, TOPCODED AT 500 
 
 
As Figure 7 shows, most litigation matters involve litigation holds affecting 
relatively few employees—well over half of the matters had twenty holds or 
fewer.  Yet, the distribution of litigation holds across matters is highly skewed, 
and there is a “long tail” of matters in which huge numbers of employees are 
placed on hold in each case.  This means that a small percentage of litigation 
matters can account for the bulk of all litigation-hold activity.  Indeed, across 
sampled companies, five percent of matters account for more than fifty-two 
percent of litigation-hold notices issued.104 
                                               
 103. For graphical clarity, the distribution of the number of employees on hold per matter in 
Figure 7 is topcoded at 500.  Matters with more than 500 employees subject to hold are included in 
the right-most vertical bar. 
 104. See Preservation Costs Survey Report, supra note 19, at 40 tbl.11.  This pattern also holds 
for employment litigation specifically.  Across companies for which the data is available, the top 
five percent of employment-related matters account for almost exactly half (49.5%) of all 
employment-related litigation holds.  See id. at 41 tbl.12. 
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Notably, the patterns that appear in the Preservation Costs Survey data 
resemble the patterns that other researchers have found in the context of outside 
counsel’s litigation costs.  In their Civil Rules Survey, Lee and Willging found 
that while the median case had relatively low litigation costs ($15,000 for 
plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants), the 95th percentile case involved costs of 
approximately $300,000 for each party.105  Figure 8 presents the distribution of 
litigation costs from the Civil Rules Survey. 
 
FIGURE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF LITIGATION COSTS PER PARTY, 




Strikingly, even though Figure 7 describes preservation costs borne by the 
client and includes matters not filed in court while Figure 8 assesses litigation 
costs incurred by outside counsel for filed lawsuits, the patterns are virtually 
identical.  Also parallel is the fact that in the Civil Rules Survey data, the top five 
percent of cases accounted for more than half of all litigation costs.106  Notably, 
this long tail of litigation costs is the product of discovery costs, not the product 
                                               
 105. Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 35–37. 
 106. To be precise, 5% of all cases accounted for 59.4% of defendants’ total litigation costs 
across all cases.  Author’s calculations (available upon request from author) are based on data from 
the Civil Rules Survey.  The author thanks Emery G. Lee, III for sharing the Civil Rules Survey data 
with him. 
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of trials, motion practice, or the like.  Federal Judicial research indicates that 
while most cases have little or no discovery costs, in the fraction of cases that 
do actively involve discovery, discovery often accounts for the vast majority of 
all costs.107  This suggests that the long tail of costs is a phenomenon that broadly 
describes all phases of preservation and discovery. 
In sum, these results reveal that preservation costs are not high in most cases, 
but the distribution is highly skewed, with a long tail in which a relatively small 
number of highly complex and burdensome cases account for a large share of 
the total costs.  Thus, the “typical” case is no cause for concern, but the 
“average” case may have a very high level of preservation activity because a 
small but important number of cases substantially drive up the total costs of 
preservation. 
IV.  THREE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND RULEMAKING 
A.  The Sombrero and the Erie/Hanna Boundary 
As noted above, the Federal Rules have never mentioned the duty to preserve 
nor placed any requirements on what data litigants retain—only what they 
produce.  Nonetheless, current federal case law has created rules governing 
preservation that impose preservation obligations on parties even before a suit is 
filed.108  This case law is almost exclusively the product of the district courts, as 
discovery-related orders and most orders imposing sanctions for failure to 
preserve are interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable.109  This raises the 
doctrinal question of whether a wholly judge-made federal common law of 
preservation is consistent with the Erie doctrine. 
Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts cannot create rules of decision through 
federal common law, but must decide cases by interpreting and applying state 
substantive law or codified federal law.110  Underlying this decision was the 
recognition of the principle, embodied in the Rules of Decision Act, that 
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, 
                                               
 107. Stancil, supra note 85, at 100 (“According to one recent study, discovery consumes 
approximately 50% of all federal litigation expenditures; moreover, that study noted that discovery 
can account for ‘as much as 90% of the litigation costs in the cases where discovery is actively 
employed.’”) (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 
1999) (192 F.R.D. 340, 357)). 
 108. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2005‒08 (discussing varying approaches to pre-litigation 
preservation obligations among district and circuit courts and their impact on potential, not actual, 
litigants). 
 109. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: 
A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 735 (2006) 
(describing the various approaches courts take toward permitting review of orders for the discovery 
of allegedly privileged information). 
 110. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
898 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:867 
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. . . . There is no federal 
general common law.”111 
The notion that a federal common law of preservation might trample upon the 
domain of state substantive law, thereby running afoul of the Erie doctrine, is 
hardly obvious.  Preservation seems procedural in nature, and every court has 
inherent power to ensure the integrity of its proceedings and judgments.112  
Therefore, a federal judge would naturally assume she can invoke judge-made 
federal law to regulate the pre-filing preservation activity of litigants in federal 
court.113  It would seem almost tautological that if a federal judge is asked to 
enforce preservation law, then the subjects of that law are parties in federal court 
whose actions are governed by federal procedures for conduct in court.  The 
shaded area in Figure 9 illustrates this view of the scope of the federal law on 
preservation. 
 
FIGURE 9: THE PERCEIVED SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE 
 
                                               
 111. Id.  See also Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
 112. Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 833‒35 (2008) 
(describing differing views about the judicial branch’s inherent control over judicial procedure 
relative to that of Congress). 
 113. Cf. id. at 834 n.65. 
Disputes settled 
out of court 
Pre-filing preservation 
Disputes that 
end up in 
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Disputes that 
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The problem is that preservation decisions are often made ex ante, i.e., before 
a lawsuit is filed.114  If federal rules governing preservation apply to pre-filing 
conduct, then the federal rules govern the conduct of parties in every dispute that 
could end up in federal court, including those disputes that ultimately end up in 
state court or are never litigated at all.  The shaded area in Figure 10 represents 
the extent to which federal preservation law could affect cases.  (The partially 
shaded area denotes the possibility of federal preservation duties affecting cases 
filed in state court while there is still a possibility of removal to federal court). 
 




Of course, federal law regulates the conduct of companies and individuals 
outside of federal court in many instances, including behavior that affects 
preservation and discovery.115  For example, laws define what happens when a 
                                               
 114. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 10, at 2006‒11 (exploring the standards courts use to 
determine whether parties’ duties to preserve have been triggered, which are triggered prior to filing 
the lawsuit). 
 115. See id. at 2006 n.7‒8. 
Disputes that end 
up in Federal 
Court 
Disputes that end 
up in State Court 
Disputes dropped  
without suit 
Disputes settled 
out of court 
Pre-filing preservation 
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witness is murdered and exactly how long and on what kind of media one must 
store certain emails.116  But these are substantive laws enacted by Congress or 
regulations promulgated by administrative agencies pursuant to statute, in the 
same way that laws proscribing the murder of non-witnesses or regulations 
addressing the proper storage of meat are substantive laws that dictate conduct 
outside of litigation.  In contrast, the federal law of preservation considered in 
this article is entirely a creature of common law, yet it governs the conduct of 
parties outside of federal court and even in the absence of any litigation, state or 
federal.  The fact that a number of states have created independent causes of 
action for the tort of spoliation of evidence further reveals the extent to which 
the overarching federal common law of preservation conflicts with the Erie 
doctrine.117 
Preservation decisions are, by and large, made prior to litigation when a 
potential defendant faces great uncertainty about where, if at all, it will be 
sued.118  Consequently, plaintiffs can exploit this legal variation to their 
advantage, choosing the forum “with the most demanding requirements of the 
toughest court to have spoken.”119  Nor can the process of appellate review iron 
out these stark and seemingly arbitrary variations in preservation standards 
because these standards are the product of non-appealable interlocutory rulings 
by district courts.120  To use the idioms of Erie and Hanna, these variations 
across courts invite “forum-shopping” and the arbitrary and uncertain 
application of these conflicting precedents leads to “inequitable administration 
of the laws.”121 
Still, preservation in some sense is procedural, and it would be absurd to deny 
federal courts any say in the preservation activity of litigants.  With the benefit 
of a clearer picture of the reach of current preservation law beyond the federal 
courtroom, one sees that there remain two complementary ways forward that 
restrict federal courts’ inherent, common law powers to their proper domain 
without requiring more restraint than necessary when policing spoliation. 
The first of these is through the federal rulemaking process. Federal judicial 
power under the Rules stems from the Rules Enabling Act, which authorizes the 
federal courts to enact rules of “practice and procedure” that do “not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”122  Importantly, because the Rules 
                                               
 116. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2012) (murder of a witness); Commodities and Securities 
Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (2012) (recording retention obligations for securities exchange 
members, brokers, and dealers). 
 117. See MARGARET KOESEL, ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES 
FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 50 (Daniel F. Gourash, ed., 2000). 
 118. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2007 (explaining that a potential litigant’s duty to preserve 
is triggered “prior to the initiation of litigation”). 
 119. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010), aff’d No. 
2012-1638, 2012 WL 616939 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 20, 2013). 
 120. See, e.g., Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009). 
 121. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
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Enabling Act and the Rules promulgated thereunder are codified federal law, 
Erie by its terms does not apply.123  Rather, the Supreme Court has treated the 
Rules Enabling Act as creating a more forgiving standard for legitimate judicial 
lawmaking through the Rules.124  Sibbach and Hanna merely ask whether the 
Federal Rule “really regulates procedure” regardless of whether it also affects 
substantive rights.125  It is self-evident that the preservation law “really regulates 
procedure.” 
The second method is to limit the scope of federal court regulation of pre-
litigation preservation activity to solely pre-litigation activity that is directed 
toward the court.  It would then become difficult to question using the inherent 
power to punish litigants who—in anticipation of a lawsuit—deliberately act to 
undermine the integrity of the court proceedings.  This is exactly the sort of 
behavior against which the Supreme Court permitted the deployment of inherent 
power in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.126  While the misconduct in Chambers 
occurred out of court, and prior to the filing of a federal lawsuit, the Court 
emphasized the bad faith and intentional character of conduct whose purpose 
was to frustrate the anticipated federal proceedings.127 
As applied to preservation, this is the approach taken by the Southern District 
of Texas in Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata,128 which held that 
bad faith was required for the court to issue sanctions for a pre-litigation failure 
to preserve.129  But the law is sharply divided on this point, and a bad faith 
requirement is not applied consistently under current law.130  A more widely 
cited case from the Southern District of New York, Pension Committee of 
University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC,131 
imposed sanctions for pre-litigation failure to preserve based on gross 
negligence.132 
                                               
 123. See Spencer, supra note 10, at 2031–32. 
 124. See Shady Grove Orthopedics Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010). 
 125. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).  This rule was 
followed in Shady Grove, albeit only by a plurality of the court.  See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 
(2010). 
 126. 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). 
 127. Id. at 37, 50‒51 (affirming the district court’s imposition of sanctions on a party whose 
“entire course of conduct . . . evidenced bad faith and an attempt to perpetuate a fraud on the court,” 
including contact that took place before the lawsuit was filed). 
 128. 688 F.Supp.2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 129. Id. at 614. 
 130. See Robert A. Weninger, Electronic Discovery and Sanctions for Spoliation: Perspectives 
from the Classroom, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 775, 790 (2012) (explaining that the federal circuits differ 
by requiring either negligence, gross negligence, or bad faith before issuing sanctions). 
 131. 685 F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (abrogated in part by Chin v. Port Auth. of New 
York & New Jersey, 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that failure to institute a litigation 
hold is not gross negligence per se)). 
 132. Id. at 496. 
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B.  The Iceberg and the Law/Technology Boundary 
The preservation iceberg reveals that preservation is a much more expensive, 
higher-stakes stage of discovery than was previously understood.  It also negates 
the belief that technology alone can reduce the costs and burdens of discovery, 
especially in the context of preservation.  An irony of the debate on preservation 
costs is that the most often cited costs of preservation—technology costs—are 
only a small part of the problem, and for large companies, reducing the burdens 
of preservation will probably involve further increasing technology costs.  Total 
burdens will fall as human costs are reduced, even as (and precisely because) the 
most salient costs of preservation—big ticket technology spending—will rise. 
But that is the good news. 
The bad news is that the iceberg is primarily a large-company phenomenon.  
For smaller companies, there is no “tip of the iceberg.”  All or nearly all of their 
preservation costs are human costs.  Without the scale of litigation activity that 
justifies the fixed costs associated with litigation-hold management systems— 
data vaults, and legal IT staff—the costs borne by smaller businesses are not 
technology costs at all, but human costs. 
This helps explain the Survey result that smaller companies and larger 
companies reported similar burdens.  Precisely because they are smaller and face 
fewer lawsuits, it is not generally cost effective for smaller companies to make 
expensive, but beneficial, investments in sophisticated automated systems or in-
house expertise.  Thus, although preservation disputes or spoliation allegations 
are rarer for smaller companies, these companies are also far less equipped to 
handle these controversies. 
This is true even for companies in the technology field itself; one respondent, 
a tech company with about 100 employees, explained: 
We are a small company, but we are in a space where we need to 
protect our IP and also to prevent customers from eluding payment. 
We manage most of the process in house, but it is a huge burden on 
our IT.  We are looking at vaulting solutions for e-mail, which should 
be a big help.  But the costs are enormous, and vendors are unwilling 
to give us a good demo or trial vault.133 
Instead, smaller companies may have to rely on ad-hoc, outside assistance, 
which may be less efficient and more expensive on a per-case basis.  One 
respondent, an industrial company with about 200 employees, explained: 
Our company along with every other company in our industry is 
involved in several suits concerning one toxic tort-related issue. We 
are a very small player in this field.  Yet, we have to produce the same 
documents as the big guys. In our case, our IT employee, our 
President, our Accountant, our Attorney, etc. [have] to devote all of 
                                               
 133. Survey Response of Respondent 2865509178 (Anonymous ID). 
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their time to answer discovery.  We also employ an outside law firm 
at an hourly rate to help us.  It is very costly.134 
Thus, technology is not a substitute for legal reform because technological 
solutions are only practical for the largest companies for which the economies 
of scale from high-tech solutions justify their high price tags.  For smaller 
companies—those with hundreds of employees—technology plays a much 
smaller role in the preservation process.  From this point of view, legal 
innovation, rather than technological innovation, may be the best hope for 
controlling the costs of individuals, small businesses, and NGOs, and virtually 
every potential litigant other than the largest and most sophisticated litigants. 
C.  The Long Tail and Transsubstantivity/Tailoring Boundary 
The fact that most of the costs of preservation are generated by a small fraction 
of cases suggests that it may be productive to devise Rules to control 
preservation costs and focus those Rules on particular categories of large, 
information-intensive cases.  This may require steps away from a commitment 
to transsubstantivity to which the Rules generally adhere.  But there are ways to 
design discovery rules to address cost that neither sort cases into substantive 
categories nor require judges to do so.  The “long tail” provides us with a way 
to do this.  Because preservation and discovery costs are highly skewed, the 
Federal Rules can set presumptive, quantitative limits on the scale of 
preservation and discovery such that the “typical” case is unaffected but the 
court and the parties have levers for controlling litigation costs in particularly 
large or complex cases. 
Parties should be provided tools to reduce discovery costs because active 
judicial oversight of discovery, although widely praised as highly effective, 
rarely occurs.135  Close judicial oversight of preservation is even less feasible 
given that the duty to preserve may trigger before a suit is even filed.136  
Furthermore, the fog of litigation is greatest at the outset of a case; yet this is 
precisely when judicial supervision of preservation would be required.137 
Thus, it is essential that the parties have tools for negotiating the scope of 
preservation and discovery.  It is not enough to rely on negotiations to arise 
                                               
 134. Survey Response of Respondent 2867300205 (Anonymous ID).  Note that this company 
refers to its “IT employee” in the singular.  Id. 
 135. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 638‒39 (finding the judicial oversight ineffective and 
impractical). 
 136. See Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 F.Supp.2d 997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
 137. Judges may also have little incentive to monitor preservation and discovery costs; if high 
discovery costs induce settlement, as many models of litigation predict, and judges prefer leisure 
to effort, then active case management not only imposes the direct and immediate cost of effort on 
the part of the judge, but it increases the likelihood that the case will not settle, which requires 
further judicial effort.  See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 31 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2013); William H.J. Hubbard, Nuisance Litigation 1‒2 (April 1, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Univ. of Cal.-Berkeley School of Law), http://scholarship. 
law.berkeley.edu/law_econ/Spring2014/Schedule/12/. 
904 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:867 
organically or to require negotiations by rule.  In those cases where negotiating 
is productive, the parties have an incentive to negotiate regardless of any 
requirement to do so, and in those cases where it is not productive, requiring 
negotiations to occur will not make it so.  The question remains—how can the 
Rules get parties to sit down and address preservation in a cost-effective way?  
To some extent, there is little that the Rules can do because for most disputes the 
duty to preserve attaches before a lawsuit is filed, and in many cases before an 
opposing party contacts the preserving party.138  At least initially in these 
disputes, the scope, and therefore costs, of preservation are set without any 
opportunity for parties to work together to control these costs.139 
To the extent that it is feasible for the parties to work together to control 
preservation costs, the Rules can give the parties incentives to negotiate a scope 
of preservation that prioritizes important data while attending to cost concerns 
as well.  Under the current Rules, the parties do not have any incentive to 
negotiate.  Because courts lack the information to conduct a careful balancing of 
the costs and benefits envisioned by Rule 26, the default rule under current law 
is usually to place no firm limits on preservation or discovery.140 
How does this affect incentives?  Consider the scenario where an individual 
plaintiff (or putative class action representative) sues a large company.  The 
plaintiff has essentially no data relevant to the case, but the company has vast 
quantities of data, some of which may be relevant to the case and some of which 
may not.  The plaintiff’s attorney has little incentive to agree to reasonable limits 
on the scope of preservation in order to save costs, as the plaintiff will have no 
preservation costs in any event.  The problem is that the parties do not have 
anything over which to negotiate.141 
Compared to other stages of discovery in “asymmetrical” litigation, 
preservation is especially problematic.  A plaintiff with no information still has 
an incentive to limit discovery requests for production because larger production 
increases the plaintiff’s own costs of review.  But a broad demand for 
preservation has no such self-correcting feature; the costs are borne entirely by 
the defendant. 
If both sides to a dispute have similar preservation burdens, then there 
certainly is something to negotiate over.  Each party can agree to preserve only 
the documents most likely to be relevant and not preserve the rest.  Each then 
saves a lot of time, money, and aggravation at the cost of a small potential loss 
                                               
 138. See Surowiec, 790 F.Supp.2d at 1005. 
 139. DISCOVERY SUBCOMM., supra note 13, at 4.  As one in-house counsel put it, “I can’t talk 
to opposing counsel because there is no opposing counsel.”  Id. 
 140. See supra notes 35‒39 and accompanying text. 
 141. There is a qualification to this: The defendant and the plaintiff could negotiate over how 
much the defendant has to pay the plaintiff in order to avoid the unconfined duty to preserve.  But 
this sort of negotiation—usually referred to as a “nuisance settlement”—is definitely not the kind 
of negotiation that the author suspects the Rules aspire to encourage.  See Hubbard, supra note 137, 
at 2. 
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in the number of relevant documents.  This is exactly the sort of sound cost-
benefit analysis that the Rules anticipate.  The agreed-upon scope of preservation 
may be over- or under-inclusive, but the costs and benefits are symmetrical and, 
more importantly, agreed upon—and therefore settled and insulated from 
wasteful second-guessing down the road. 
If this analysis is correct, then the majority of preservation headaches would 
arise in the context of “asymmetrical” litigation where one side has little or 
nothing to preserve, and the other has large quantities of data.  Using individual-
versus-company (as opposed to company-versus-company) litigation as a proxy 
for asymmetrical litigation, the Survey’s findings confirm this prediction. 
 
TABLE 4: PRESERVATION-RELATED PROBLEMS BY OPPOSING PARTY TYPE  
     (5 = “VERY OFTEN” AND 1 = “VERY RARELY”) 
Configuration of Parties Average Rating 
Large, complex matters,  
individuals on other side 
3.81 
Large, complex matters,  
businesses on other side 
3.45 
Small, routine matters, 
individuals on other side 
2.99 
Small, routine matters,  
business on other side 
2.59 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the Survey.142  Respondents reported higher 
levels of preservation-related problems in litigation against individuals than in 
litigation against other businesses.  Further, these differences are highly 
statistically significant.143 
The key, therefore, is to structure the Rules so that in cases where costs are 
likely to be large, both parties have something to lose and something to gain in 
preservation negotiations.  The Rules governing production in discovery already 
do this.  Rule 30 sets presumptive limits on the number and length of 
                                               
 142. A total of 122 respondents provided responses to this set of questions on the frequency of 
preservation-related problems based on the type of litigation and opposing party. 
 143. Using these results, the Survey tested two hypotheses using paired, two-tailed t-tests: (1) 
among large, complex matters, the means for cases against individuals and for cases against 
businesses are (statistically) the same, and (2) among small, routine matters, the means for cases 
against individuals and for cases against businesses are (statistically) the same.  Both hypotheses 
are rejected at the one percent level. 
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depositions.144  Rule 33 sets presumptive limits on the number of written 
interrogatories.145  To avoid obvious injustices, Rule 26(b)(2)(A) permits the 
court to issue an order altering these presumptive limits.146  In practice, however, 
most exceptions to these presumptions are negotiated by the parties and not 
determined by judicial order.  Meaningful negotiation occurs in this context 
because the Rules, by construction, ensure that both sides of any discovery 
dispute have bargaining chips, as they can agree to more or fewer depositions. 
Thus, in the preservation and document discovery context, a similar approach 
should be effective.  Establishing a presumptive limit of fifteen to twenty 
custodians to be subject to litigation holds ensures that every party to a 
preservation dispute has bargaining chips.  In most cases, this presumptive limit 
will be uncontroversial and not disturbed.  In the cases where it is controversial, 
even a party with no preservation obligations itself will have an incentive to 
make meaningful rather than outlandish preservation demands because the other 
party now has a bargaining chip.  A party can offer to preserve more in exchange 
for cost-justified concessions with respect to other aspects of discovery, or in 
exchange for cost-sharing between the parties. 
The long tail of litigation costs indicates that Rules based on presumptive 
limits can be calibrated to leave the large numbers of cases with modest costs 
and few discovery disputes untouched, while directing parties’ efforts, and 
potentially courts’ attention, to the smaller set of cases with high costs.  
Presumptive limits can be set relatively low, but still impose no binding 
constraints on parties in most disputes.  Existing Rules addressing depositions 
appear to do this already.  For example, data collected by Emery Lee III and 
Thomas Willging indicates that in most cases, surveyed attorneys deposed five 
or fewer non-expert witnesses, well below the limit of ten set by Rule 30.147 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Until now, knowledge of the costs of preservation and discovery depended on 
anecdote and speculation.  This research on preservation costs has made a first 
step toward a more rigorous, quantitative understanding of how preservation 
activity is distributed across cases and how its various costs stack up against 
each other.  The discovery sombrero, the preservation iceberg, and the long tail 
of costs serve as basic, stylized facts in this regard. 
These facts also serve to inform legal and policy debate.  This includes, most 
immediately, currently pending amendments to the Federal Rules, which, if 
adopted, would expressly address preservation for the first time.  As the 
                                               
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (providing that each party may take no 
more than ten depositions, each of which may be no longer than seven hours). 
 145. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (providing that each party may serve no more than twenty-five 
written interrogatories upon another party). 
 146. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A). 
 147. Civil Rules Survey, supra note 2, at 10. 
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discussion of the discovery sombrero and Erie makes clear, moving the locus of 
federal lawmaking in this area from federal common law to rulemaking under 
the Rules Enabling Act is a welcome development.  Additionally, as the 
discussion of the preservation iceberg makes clear, the decision of the 
rulemaking committees to act now rather than wait for technological solutions 
is good news for the vast majority of parties who cannot afford to use the high 
fixed costs of technology to control the costs of preservation. 
Of course, the merits of exactly how the Rules address preservation is up for 
debate.  In the discussion of the long tail of costs, this article advocates for an 
approach that would create clear, presumptive limits on the scope of preservation 
and discovery in order to encourage mutually beneficial bargaining that would 
define the proper scope of preservation and discovery in cost-intensive cases.  
Such an approach is admittedly far from perfect because it does little to address 
preservation costs that arise before the parties join issue in court, but it is an 
important potential path not yet taken by the rulemakers. 
More importantly, though, any meaningful assessment of the merits of 
standards governing preservation must take into account both the costs and 
benefits of preservation.  While this research has begun to quantify the costs, 
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